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A. Present some information and use economic principles to: 
1. help you better understand the economic environment within which 
you operate 
2. develop some insights into how your markets are affected by 
public policies 
3. anticipate the kinds of economic events that may affect your 
business in the months ahead, and 
4. help you find a way to make a few extra bucks. 
SLIDE 1: ECONOMIC POLICY AND OUTLOOK FOR 1986 
A. Economic relationships have changed in ways that have significant 
impacts on the agricultural sector. 
1. Macro economic policies of both the U.S. and foreign countries 
have become dominant factors in the U.S. farm economy 
2. Agricultural policies of other countries have become more 
important to the economic prospects of U.S. agriculture and agri-
business than is domestic farm policy 
3. Changes in financial market conditions are as important as are 
changes in the price prospects for farm commodities 
4. Incomes of people living on farms are now more dependent upon 
employment in the nonfarm sector than on farm income 
5. Farming is becoming increasingly divided between those who: 
a. operate the farm as a profit-seeking business (e.g., com-
mercial farms), and 
b. are rural residents that enjoy farming as a way of life 
(e.g., hobby farms) 
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6. In many ways, agribusiness is more dependent upon economic swings 
in agriculture than are farmers 
a. or, at least those farmers in the latter category, above 
b. yet, farm policy continues to focus on the "family farm", a 
concept of uncertain meaning particularly in the economic 
context of the business of agriculture 
B. These changes create new, complex and often confusing dimensions to 
the agricultural economy 
1. Our efforts are aimed at broadening your understanding, and at 
some possible solutions for your consideration 
C. Summary -- What we will say! 
1. Overall, people are reasonably optimistic about the economy 
a. Consumer confidence has been quite high 
b. Unemployment has drifted down to a reasonably comfortable 
level 
c. Inflation has behaved better than most people expected 
d. Consumer spending has been sufficient to return the economy 
to a growth trend 
2. But, there are a number of trouble spots in the economy 
a. The external sectors continue to fare poorly 
(1) imports continue to grow at a dramatic pace, giving 
rise to increasing calls for protectionism 
(2) exports continue to weaken, creating disequities in the 
labor market 
b. Credit markets are experiencing considerable uncertainty 
(1) The federal government continues to borrow vast sums to 
cover its operating deficit 
(2) the country's external debt is mounting 
(3) external debts of many developing countriP.s are 
essentially uncollectible 
(4) real interest rates remain near record high levels 
(5) the ability to service the high agricultural debt is 
increasingly being questioned 
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c. Agriculture is suffP.ring the double-whammy of a high debt 
hurden and a dPclininp; forPip;n tradP bal.<lnce 
(1) Foreign competition has increased dramatically 
(2) Commodity markets are weighted down by record or 
near-record surpluses 
(3) Wealth in the farm sector is rapidly eroding 
(4) Financial stress among farmers has flooded over into 
the agribusiness sector 
3. As usual, however, prospects differ among enterprises, 
individuals and firms. 
QUESTION !---Expansionary monetary policy was largely responsible for the 
improved economy in late 1985 and early 1986, but at a cost of 
future inflation. 
SLIDE 2: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
A. After a year of torrid economic growth in 1984, the rate of expansion 
of the U.S. economy slowed somewhat in 1985 
1. GNP in nominal terms (current dollars) 
a. 1985: +6% 
b. 1984: +10.8% 
c. 198 3: + 7. 7% 
2. GNP in real terms (deflated to 1972 dollars) 
a. 1985: +2 • .5% 
b. 1984: +6.8% 
c. 1983: +3. 7% 
3. Inflation, after dropping significantly from the 1980 peak of 
13.5% (CPI), has held surprisingly steady 
a. 1985: 3. 7% 
b. 1984: 4. 3% 
c. 1983: 3.2% 
4. Employment 
a. 2.4 million jobs added in 1985, following 4.8 million in 1984 
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b. unemployment dropped to 7. 0'% from 7. 5% in 1984, 9. 5% in 1982 
and 1983 
5. 1985 growth was paced by: 
a. government spending, up 9.1% 
b. consumer spending, up 7.1% 
6. Only a modest, 3.1% growth in new business investment 
a. followed a dramatic 35% jump in 1984 
b. was held down by 
(1) a decrease in plant utilization rates 
(2) continued increase in "off shore" investment where both 
labor and capital costs are lower 
(3) a 10% decline in after-tax business profits, due in 
part to aggressive foreign competition 
7. A record large trade deficit ($88 billion) has also been a drag 
on the economy 
B. For 1986, a 4 trillion dollar economy is projected 
1. Growth (in nominal terms) about matching 1985 
2. Inflation is expected to nudge up above 4% again 
>LIDE 3: FEDERAL BUDGET AND DEBT 
A. The most important factor behind the recovery from the 1980-82 
recessions has been stimulative federal fiscal policy 
B. About $200 billion per year spent in excess of income since 1983 
1. is pushing the federal debt rapidly toward $2 trillion 
2. a large share of this debt is held by foreigners (approximately 
$200 billion) 
a. beginning in 1983, inflow of foreign capital has exceeded 
outflow of U.S. investment abroad 
h. 11.S. is now a net dehtor nation 
3. fhus, a significant share of the U.S. economic growth over the 
past ~ years has been financed by foreigners 
a. which reduces the funds they have left to spend on things, 
including U.S. goods 
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c. NotP thP impart of tax ruts in 1981 on revPnues 
O. Federal deficit projected at $200 billion or more tor next several 
yPars 
1. Question is: how will it be f1nanced? 
2. Alternatives are: 
a. keep borrowing from foreigners (drives up both interest rate 
and value of dollar) 
b. expand the money sHpp]y (inflationary) 
3. Or, cut the deficit by 
a. reducing growth in expenditures 
b. increasing taxes 
r. eithPr way, stimulus for economir growth that comes from 
"double spending" of the deficit is removed, pojnting to 
slower growth 
SLIDE 4: GNP FOR 1986/85 
A. For 1986, the federal budget deficit is pretty well set in concrete 
B. 
c. 
1. Thus, another year of stimulation should keep the economy growing 
at a respectabJe pace 
The big cloud continues to be foreign trade 
I. Another trade deficit in the $100 billion range seems likely 
2. Despite some easing in the dollar's value, it is still 20-30% 
overvalued relative to foreign trade equilibrium 
The hidden enemy in the longer term is inf lat ion 
1. Monetary relaxation which began :l.n 1985 to ease interest rates 
eventually will generate inflationary pressure 
2. The easing of the dollar, particularly vis-a-vis the currencies 
of other industrial countries, will raise the pr1ce of import~d 
goods (for which the nation has developed a gigantic appetite) 
ANSWER 1 : AGREE 
QUESTION 2 U.S. agriculture has lost its competitiveness in world markets 
since 1981 
SLIDE 5: WORLD GRAIN PRODUCTION AND USE 
A. First, let's look at the world production and use situation 
1. Food grains, feed grains and oil seeds account, directly or 
indirectly, for about 75% of human nutrition around the world 
2. This slide tells much about world food markets 
B. Years when use exceeds production (1977, 1980, 1983) 
1. World stocks are being depleted 
2. World market prices rise 
C. Years when production exceeds use (1976, 1978, 1981, 1982, 1984, 
1985): 
1. World stocks are being built 
2. Prices decline 
3. The most serious pr1c1ng problems occur when stocks are building 
over 2 or more years (1981-1982, 1984-1985) 
D. Note the upward trend in use (consumption), broken in 1981 
1. World-wide recession, brought on by the U.S. switch from an 
expansionary to restrictive monetary policy, caused a reduction 
in buying power (income) 
2. Since 1982 growth in both income and food consumption have 
returned 
a. but, with a gap between the trend line consumption of the 
1970s and the 1980s 
b. it was that gap, set off in 1981, that caused a slow-down in 
world agricultural trade 
c. however, world trade has trended upward since 1982, with the 
return to growth in world use 
SLIDE 6: U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 
A. Wheat, soybeans and feed grains account for 85-90% of U.S. 
agricultural exports 
B. The decline in U.S. farm PXports began in 1981 
l. CorrPspon<le<l w1th thP derlinP in world food rnnqumption 
C. However, the decline has continued since thPn 
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1. even though world usP (and trade) has turned up 
2. the obvious conclusion is, the U.S. has lost market share, e.g., 
competitiveness 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
SLIDE 7: ll. S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 
U.S. 
Corn 
74 
74 
72 
66 
62 
Share of World MarkPt (%) 
- - -·-- -- - -- - -----~- -
Wheat Soybeans 
44 86 
38 86 
35 77 
34 69 
30 72 
A. This slide shows, by class of commodity, export sales as a share of 
total cash receipts to the producers of these commodities 
B. The rapid increase in the relative importance of export sales during 
the 1970s is obvious 
1. as is the decline since then 
C. Also notice the large relative importance of export sales as a source 
of cash receipts for growers of our principle crops in Ohio--corn, 
soybeans and wheat (about 55-60% of cash receipts to Ohio farmers) 
1. Thus, the Ohio agricultural economy is particularly dependent upon 
exports 
D. A major issue is, what is the cause of our loss of competitiveness? 
SLIDE 8: AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND THE VALUE OF THE DOLLAR 
A. The direct relationship between the value of the dollar and 
agricultural trade is obvious 
1. A declining dollar (early, late 1970s) lowers the effective price 
of U.S. exports and raises that of imports 
2. A rising dollar (early 1980s) has the opposite effect 
3. These are fairly rapid responses 
B. However, there is also an indirect relationship that is more 
Jong-term in natur~ 
1. This is the impact that dollar exchange rates have on 
agricultural production in other countries 
2. Because of the dominant share U.S. corn, soybeans and wheat have 
in world markets, a strong dollar has the effect of raising the 
world price level for these commodities 
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a. these higher world prices encov<age other countries to expand 
agricultural production 
b. high guaranteed domestic prices are used as production 
incentives 
(1) the cost of such price guarantees is low when world 
price levels are high 
c. as other countries expand production in response to high 
prices, some who were importers become exporters 
(1) i.e. the European Community, China, India 
d. these countries dispose of their surpluses by subsidizing 
their sale in the export market 
(1) thus, increasing the competition faced by the U.S. 
e. the higher the U.S. drives world price, the less costly it is 
for other countries to pursue such policies 
3. There has been considerable debate over which has the biggest 
impact--the U.S. dollar or U.S. support prices (loan rates) 
4. Our studies show that, based on 22 years of data, the U.S. share 
of world grain markets is about 5 times more sensitive to changes 
in the exchange rate than to changes in the loan rate. 
SLIDE 9: VALUE OF THE U.S. DOLLAR 
A. This shows changes in the average cost of the U.S. dollar to foreign 
buyers of our corn and soybeans, weighted by market shares of each of 
the major importing countries. 
B. The dollar has stabilized somewhat recently 
1. More so for soybean customers than for corn 
2. A larger share of soybean exports are sold to industrialized 
countries who have stronger currencies than the less indus-
trialized nations 
C. Despite the recent stabilization, the dollar still costs 100-150% 
more, on average, than it did during its cheapest days in 1979-80 
1. Thus, U.S. prices would have to be cut by one-half or more simply 
to keep effective world prices for U.S. corn and soybeans at 
1979/80 levels 
2. This would be roughly $1.40 for corn and $3.50 for soybeans 
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SLIDE 10: GRAIN YIELDS: U.S. VS. NON U.S. 
A. Except for corn, notice that U.S. yields have declined relative to 
yields in the rest of the world since 1965. 
B. Thjs shows, in part, the impacts of greater production incentives 
around the world. 
I. Acreages have also responded in a similar matter 
c. It is a long term process to reverse these trends even if the 
dollar declines, making it more costly to maintain such production 
incentives 
1. Thus, it is unlikely that the U.S.'s competitive position will 
quickly be restored even if (or when) the dollar declines 
appreciably 
SLIDE 11: U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AND FARM PRICES 
A. This slide dramatically illustrates the relationship between U.S. 
agricultural exports and the value of U.S. farm products 
B. With the U.S. population, and thus domestic food demand growing at 
less than 1% per year, the importance of the external market to the 
economic viability of U.S. agriculture is obvious 
ANSWER 2: AGREE 
QUESTION 3--Incomes to farm families have fallen dramatically. 
SLIDE 12: DISPOSABLE PERSONABLE INCOME OF FARM AND NONFARM POPULATION 
A. The slide shows that the per capita real DPI of the non-farm popu-
lation has generally grown at a steady rate since the Depression 
1. the compound growth rate was 2.1% per year from 1934-1985 
2. exceptions to this steady growth include: 
a. the upward "blip" due to WW II 
b. the recession of 1979-1982 
B. The DPI from all sources for the farm population grew at a faster 
rate--3.6 percent per year--than the DPI of the non-farm population 
over 1934-1985 
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1. However, the growth rate has varied significantly over time: 
1934-1946 8.7% 
1947-1959 -0.9% 
1960-1971 6.1% 
1972-1979 5.4% 
1980-1985 -4.4% 
2. The net result is that the farm population has gained relative to 
the non-farm population: 
Farm DPI/Non-Farm DPI 
1934-1946 44% 
1957-1959 49% 
1960-1971 62% 
1972-1979 91% 
1980-1985 78% 
C. The overall growth in farm DPI can be attributed in large part to two 
factors: 
1. Non-farm sources of income have become increasingly important to 
the farm population. 
a. Non-farm sources of farm DPI grew at annual rate of 4.4% over 
1934-1985, much faster than farm sources, which grew at an 
annual rate of 2.7%. 
b. In 1985, non-farm sources accounted for 62% of farm DPI. By 
comparison, non-farm sources averaged only 31% of farm DPI 
during 1930's and 1940's. 
c. The movement towards off-farm employment began in earnest 
during the late 19SO's and early 1960's. 
2. The second important factor was the decrease in farm population 
a. In 1934, the farm population was just over 32 million. By 
1985, the farm population had dropped to just under seven 
million people 
b. The rate of decline in the farm population over 1934-1985 was 
2.9 percent per year. The annual growth rate of aggregate 
farm DPI was only 0.1 percent per year. Thus, a relatively 
constant income was divided up among fewer and fewer farmers 
D. Prospects for 1986 and beyond 
1. Per capita farm DPI (all sources) is expected to grow three to 
four percent in nominal terms during 1986. Thus, in real terms 
farm DPI is expected to stay constant or increase slightly 
2. Farm population decreases will accelerate due to financial 
problems. The decline during 1986 is expected to be in the range 
four to six percent. 
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3. Non-farm sour~es of DPT are expected to continue to contribute 
b0-70 percent ot farm DPI 
4. For the intermediate-run (three to five years), it is unlikely 
that farm DPI will attain the lPve}s reached durjng the 1970's. 
5. Problems may be especially acute for those relying totally on 
income from farm sources, which will likely be substantially 
below 1970's levels on a real per capita basis 
6. In the longer-run (five to ten years), those surviving current 
financial problems will have to share the "income pie" with fewer 
farmers. 
7. The real income pie is not likely to expand dramatically, 
however, because of the low income elasticity of food, slowing 
birthrates around the world, and increased competition from 
foreign producers. 
SLIDE 13: PRICES FOR FARM INPUTS 
A. Livestock Placements 
1. Units 
Beef No. 
Hogs No. 
Poultry No. 
2. Price 
B. Feed 
Beef 
Hogs 
Animal Units 
Feeding Rate 
Price 
c. Seed 
Acreage 
Price 
down 
? 
-8-10% 
-8-10% 
1985/84 
-5-6% 
-2-4% 
+4-6% 
1985/84 
down 
up 
down 
SLIDE 14: PRICES FOR PURCHASED INPUTS 
+2-4% 
+1-3% 
1986/85 
-3-5% 
-1-2% 
+3. 5% 
1986/85 
N/C 
up slightly 
down 
A. Chemical prices have increased only moderately since 1977 
1. Prices are expected to be constant or fall slightly during 1986 
2. Chemicals will continue to be a good buy 
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B. Through 1983, interest rates increased faster than any other input 
price 
1. Since 1983, interest rates have fallen about two 
percent 
2. Nevertheless, interest payments continue to be in the 
range of $21-23 billion, compared to $8-10 billion in the late 
1970's 
3. Neither a large increase nor decrease in interest rates is 
foreseen for 1986 
4. Non-competitive rates, however, will continue to be a problem for 
Farm Credit System borrowers due to loan losses. 
C. Fertilizer prices in 1985 continued their moderate path of 1981 through 
1984 
1. Little change is expected in fertilizer prices in 1986 as 
production is cut back to match reduced demand 
D. Machinery prices are expected to increase moderately during 1986 
1. Watch for discounts as manufacturers attempt to move backlog of 
inventory 
E. Taxes are not expected to increase markedly during 1986 
1. Carry forward of losses will limit increases 
F. Fuel prices were steady during 1985 
1. Moderate price declines are likely in 1986 due to decreased use 
2. If OPEC collapses and a crude oil "price-war" breaks out, 
significant price declines may occur 
SLIDE 15: QUANTITY OF SELECTED INPUTS 
A. Cropland has fluctuated around 1977 base of 345 million acres 
1. In 1983, PIK reduced acreage 15% to below 295 million acres 
2. Expect 1986 acreage to be reduced modestly from 1985 levels due 
to acreage reduction programs and reduced profits 
B. Labor use is expected to continue to decline two to three percent per 
year 
C. Fertilizer use has stabilized after the PIK-induced decline 
1. during 1983 the index declined to 82 
2. moved back to 95-100 in 1984 and 1985 
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3. modest increase in fertilizer use expected for 1986 
n. 1985 was the sixth consecutive year that farmers purchased less 
machinerv than the year before 
1. Declines have been the most substantial for "big-ticket" items, 
i.e. combines and four-wheel drive tractors 
2. U.S. farm machinery market currently has a 10-18 month supply of 
new tractors and harvesting equipment 
3. Prospects for a turnaround in 1986 are dim; purchases may be down 
five to ten percent 
E. Farm output continued to recover from the 1983 low during 1985 
1. 1983 decline reflects PIK and drought 
2. 1985 production will be only slightly lower than the record level 
of 1982 
3. Surpluses in nearly all major crops 
4. Historically, U.S. agriculture has increased productivity about 
1.5 percent per year 
5. Many believed productivity might slow in the 1970's and early 
1980's, however, recent developments in biotechnology point 
toward higher, rather than lower, future rates of productivity 
growth 
ANSWER 3--DISAGREE 
QUESTION 4--DECLINING LAND VALUES HAVE LITTLE TO DO WITH THE FINANCIAL 
PROBLEMS OF THE FARM CREDIT SYSTEM 
SLIDE 16: REAL VALUE OF U.S. FARMLAND 
A. The chart shows the ''roller coaster" ride of real, U.S. farmland 
prices since 1972 
1. Starting with an index value of 100 in 1972, land prices in-
creased rapidly to a high during 1980 
a. real land prices increased 53% in only nine years 
b. the increase was primarily a reaction to the extraordinary 
returns of 1973-74 
c. based on data from 1910-1985, the 1973 return has less than a 
one in a 1000 chance of reoccurring 
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2. Between 1981 and 1985, the real jncrease in land values was 
erased 
a. as of April l, 1985, the index value was 100, the same as it 
was on February 1, 1972 
b. the decline in value can be explained as a wearing-off of the 
return shock of 1973-1974 
c. this was reinforced by lower than expected returns during the 
early 1980s, and dramatically higher real interest rates 
SLIDE 17: CORN BELT FARMLAND VALUES 
A. The charts shows that four cornbelt states--Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
and Iowa--have experienced an even more dramatic "roller coaster 
ridP" with rPspect to real land values 
1. Real$ Change 
1972-1981 1981-1985 
Ohio 
Indiana 
Illinois 
Iowa 
+379 
+471 
+454 
+478 
-404 
-444 
-494 
-502 
a. Ohio, Illinois, and Iowa real land values in 1985 were lower 
than in 1972 
b. Illinois had the highest value at the peak in 1981; Ohio had 
the lowest peak value 
c. Iowa land values increased the most; the increase was $100 
per acre more than in Ohio 
d. Iowa land values have declined the most; the decline was 
almost $100 per acre more than in Ohio 
2. The chart does not reflect the continued deterioration in land 
values during the latter half of 1985 
a. Surveys suggest an additional real decline of 5-10% 
3. Further declines are expected for 1986. However, the magnitude 
may be much smaller 
a. D~clines for 1q86: -~-8% 
B. The decline in land values undermines the credit-worthiness of the 
farm sector 
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1. At the beginning of 1985, equity in farm sector assets, adiusted 
for inflation, was off 33% from the 1980 peak and the lowest 
since 1973 
2. For highly leveraged farmers who are simultaneously faced with 
cash tlow shortages, the erosion in equity has unde~mined the 
value of collateral that secures their debt and arcelerated the 
number of farmers headed toward technical insolvency 
a. because highly leveraged farmers owe a proportionately large 
share of outstanding farm debt, financial problems have 
extended to farm lenders 
b. as of January 1985, the USDA estimated that the five percent 
of U.S. farms experiencing the most severe financial problems 
(debt/asset greater than or equal to 70% and negative cash 
flow} hold 23% of outstanding farm debt. 
3. Financial problems are especially acute for the Farm Credit 
System, which has 90% of its loan portfolio invested in agri-
culture 
a. by comparison, the roughly 5,000 private "agricultural" banks 
in the U.S. have only 37% of their total loans invested in 
agriculture 
1) nonfarm loans are generally performing well, so the 
incidence of a lender's problem is directly proportionate 
to the degree of specialization in farm lending 
b. FCS problems are compounded by the fact that two-thirds of 
its approximately $80 billion in outstanding loans are held 
by the Federal Land Bank System. 
SLIDE 18: PROBLEM LOANS AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF THE FARM CREDIT SYSTEM 
A. The charts show estimates made by the Agricultural Economics staff at 
OSU of the problem loans and financial resources of the FCS 
1. The estimates of problem loans were not based on FCS data, due to 
the unavailability of such information 
2. Problem loan estimates were based on data from a recent USDA 
survey of the financial condition of U.S. agriculture 
a. Estimates must be used with caution because actual FCS 
problems may be more or less severe 
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B. Problem loans of the FCS: 
(Billions) 
Extreme Risk 7.74 
High Risk 8.97 
Moderate Risk 17 .10 
Total 33.81 
1. The estimates suggest that over 40% of the loan portfolio of the 
FCS may be asssociated with financially stressed farmers 
2. However, in the event of voluntary restructuring, bankruptcy, or 
foreclosure, the FCS will not lose the entire face value of 
troubled loans 
a. OSU estimates of potential losses: 
Loan Category Amount( bil.) Loss(%) Loss (bil.) 
Extreme Risk $ 7.74 50% $3.87 
High Risk $ 8.97 33% $2.96 
Moderate Risk $17 .10 10% $1. 71 
Total $8.54 
b. the loss estimates are very subjective and depend on the 
percent loss assumed. Due to the "ballpark" nature of the 
estimates, actual losses will likely bP substantially 
different 
C. FCS financial resources: 
Loan loss allowance 
Member-owned capital 
Earned surplus 
Total 
(Billions) 
$ 1. 2 
$ 5.9 
$~.:] 
$13.4 
I. It is unlikely that the entire $13.4 billion of resources will be 
available to offset losses 
a. use of member-owned capital may make financial conditions 
worse 
b. this leaves only $7.5 billion to offset losses, suggesting it 
will be difficult for the FCS to continue as a viable lending 
vehicle without governmental assistance 
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2. ThPrP is legjt1mqtp ronrPrn that liquidation ot tarmers' assets, 
1n order to pay debts, mav overwhelm asset markets, esperialJy 
real estate. 
a. tor 1nstanre, only ahout 3i of farm real estate assets are 
bought and sold annualJy 
b. this suggests that even with strong markets, it would take 
nearlv four years to complete the transfer of the roughly 11% 
of IJ.S. tarm sector assets, that need to be transferred from 
the most financialJy farmers to financially strong owners 
c. it shonld be notPd that farm <lebt constitutes only three 
perrent of total private and public sector debt in the U.S. 
d. thus it is very unlikely that a worsening of the farm credit 
problem will lead to a toa] callapse of the financial system 
SLIDE 19: FARM CREDIT POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
A. Several different types of government programs have been proposed. 
Some would assist a]l farmers, others would be targeted to FCS 
borrowers only 
1. Debt moratoria 
a. this alternative would deny the use of foreclosure procedures 
against farmers who cannot make interest and principal 
paymPnts or would: 
1) cancel or defer interest and principal payments for a 
specified period 
2) write down a portion or all of the debt 
3) deny deficiency judgements for those who cannot make 
payments 
4) combinations of the above 
b. most debt moratorium proposals include a limited period in 
which debt obligations need not be met, but they do not 
elimjnate the commitment to repay debt eventually 
c. a key to the success ot debt moratoriums is that financial 
conditions of agriculture improve 
d. the major cost of debt moratoria is the income forgone by 
lenders during the moratorium period 
e. a long-run concern is that a mo1atorium would force bankers 
to charge higher interest rates in the future to off set the 
risk of future credit disruptions 
2. Deferral of interest and/or principal payments 
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a. objective is to lower immediate debt service costs by re-
amortizing loans over an extended period of time 
b. the premise of this approach is that providing additional 
time to repay would allow farmers to rearrange the financial 
structure of thPir businesses 
3. Loan euarantee 
a. essentially what FmHA has been doing on all ot its non-direct 
operating loans and many of its long-term loans 
b. basic principle is to guarantee repayment of most (FmHA = 
qo%) or all of principle and lost interest to lender in case 
of default 
c. will not reduce debt service cost, hut can result in a credit 
extension to a farmer who would not otherwise receive a loan 
d. without other programs to reduce the debt service cost to 
farmers, a loan guarantee program might be perceived as 
simply a "lender bailout" 
4. Objective or princjpal buy down 
a. interest is to reduce debt service costs by lowering either 
the loan principle or jnterest rate or both 
b. lender typically has to agree to write down a portion of the 
principle or interest rates for the length of the loan 
c. lender may be offered a guarantee or swap of govPrnment 
securities for remaining portion of the loan 
d. government may provide a direct interest-rate subsidy 
5. Other alternatives 
a asset leasebacks 
b. marketable federal income tax credits 
c. recapitalization programs 
d. agricultural land holding corporation 
At.JSWr:R 4--01 SACREE 
QUESTION 5--f~.!!!!_J~snnmodity policy will be des1gned to reduce bot~E~_d~ction 
and cost to the federal treasury 
SLIDE 20: U.S. FARM POLICY .•• OBJECTIVES 
19 
A. TherP is always A certain uncPrtainty about farm policy 
1. Rut, this turns into a verv large uncPrtainty when devP]oping 
rlisrusstnn notes at a time when there is not--but soon will be--
a farm btll 
B. Numerous objectives can be--and are--put torward for U.S. farm policy 
1. These are not always consistent with each other 
2. The political process is used to resolve inconsistencies in 
policy objectives 
a. the greater the inconsistencies, the greater the difficulty 
in obtaining a politically acceptable compromise 
b. this is much of the explanation for why gettjng a 1985 farm 
bill has been so arduous 
C. Some of the most frequently mentioned objectives include: 
1. Supporting farm income 
a. this is generally put forward in the sense of creating parity 
between the incomes of farm and nonf arm people 
b. one complexity is that wealth is difficult to handle 
(1) income streams to farmers typically become capitalized 
into asset (usually land) values 
(2) this increases farmers wealth positions but often cuts 
into current income as greater expense is involved in 
obtaining the more valuable asset 
(3) thus, parity of incomes between capital intensive 
industries (such as farming) and others is virtually 
impossible to maintain without factoring in wealth 
(4) yet, wealth doesn't pay the bills 
2. Sufficient but not excessivP supplies 
a. this is the matter of assuring adequate food supplies without 
building surplus stocks that persistently depress prices to 
unprofitable levels 
b. in part, it reflects the goal of balance between low cost 
food and acceptable farm incomes 
3. Export competitiveness 
a. this objective deals with maintaining or expanding U.S. 
agriculture's share of world trade 
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b. related policy varjables include: 
(l) loan rates--are these so high as to pricP U.S. products 
out of world markets? 
(2) e~port promotion 
(3) export financing and credit programs 
(4) contract sanctity 
(5) cargo preference rules 
4. Stewardship of natural resources 
a. the conservation ethic: protecting our base of natural 
resources for future generations 
b. the externality issue: protecting our base of natural 
resources for down-stream users 
c. the production adjustmPnt pPrspectivP: reducing the 
production of market surpluses in the name of resource 
conservation 
S. "Family farm" agriculture 
a. many view the purpose of farm policy to maintain or 
strengthen a system of family farm agriculture 
b. there are many different views as to what is family farm 
agriculture 
(1) some take this to be small-holder agriculture, where a 
single family provides the labor, management and 
capital and receives most (if not all) of its economic 
sustenance from the farm 
(2) others take a more Jeffersonian free-holder view, where 
the ownership and control of the farm business rests 
predominantly with a family as an entrepreneurial unit 
c. despite conflicting or inconsistent views as to what is a 
family farm, most farm bills include a preamble extolling its 
virtues 
6. Equity and fairness 
A. most fArm programs redistribute income, at least from 
taxpayPrs to farmers (or some farmers) 
b. but there is a general perception that such income redis-
tribution should be "fajr" 
21 
c. in practicP, however, it is genera]ly easier to determine 
what is !:!.?_! fair (e.p; .• mjJlion dollar payments to farms 
ownf'd hy USDA program administrators) than what is fair 
7. Limited fedPral budget PXposure 
SLIDE 21: COST OF THE 1973, 1977 AND 1981 fARM BILLS 
A. This slide provides a visual representative of why the cost of farm 
policy is of increasing concern 
B. During the life of the 1981 farm bill (1981-1985) 
1. All federal government spending increased 47.3~ 
2. Outlays for USDA programs, including farm policy, increased 73.5% 
SLIDE 22: U.S. FARM POLICY ... ISSUES 
A. Cost to the federal treasury 
1. Obviously, cost-containment is an important consideration in 
light of: 
a. the rapid cost acceleration during the 1981 farm bill 
b. the mounting federal deficit 
c. the sense of unfairness associated with payments to farmers 
averaging nearly $28,000 annually 
2. But, this concern appears to have been overridden by Congress' 
desire to provide financial assistance to the farm community 
B. Loan rates 
1. The traditional concept has been "no recourse" by the lender 
(CCC) if the farmer fails to repay and forfeits the commodity 
a. this essentially establishes a minimum market price at around 
the loan rate 
b. problems occur when loan rates are above market-clearing 
price levels 
(1) forfeitures increase 
(2) raises the cost to the government, because loans 
become budget outlays 
(3) results in accumulation of government held stocks 
c. much debate over the appropriate loan rate levels 
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(1) in the 1985 farm bill, loan rates are likely to be 
tied to a certain percentage (e.g., 75-85%) of 
historic market prices 
2. A new price support loan concept proposed--the marketing loan 
a. basic idea is, the CCC loan would be discharged by selling at 
the market price, even if below the loan rate 
b. government payment would be the difference between loan and 
market price, if the latter is lower 
c. major advantage is, the loan rate doesn't set the m1n1mum 
market price, but does provide minimum price protection to 
the producer 
(1) thus, market can clear, and stocks are not accumulated 
d. major disadvantages 
(1) costly to the government if prices are below loan 
(2) market prices would be disrupted by dumping at loan 
maturity 
(3) does not resolve the debate over "appropriate" loan 
rates 
C. Target Prices 
1. The major issue: what level? 
2. Probable in the 1985 farm bill: freeze for at least 2 (possibly 
4) years at 1985 levels 
a. corn = $3.03 
b. wheat = $4.38 
D. Acreage, production controls 
1. Major debate between: 
a. continuation of voluntary acreage reductions and set-asides, 
or, 
b. mandatory quotas based on historical produrtion 
2. Basic philosophy is to cut production in order to raise market 
pricPs 
3. Voluntary approach is most likely 
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R. unpRid 10-201 diversion as R rondition of eligihility for 
program benefits 
h. aHthorization for diversion payments on an adrlitional 10-15% 
when needed to balanrP supplies 
E. Soil, Water Conservation 
1. Sodbuster approach 
a. withholds program benefits to anyone who plants row crops on 
"fragile" land (e.g., highly erodable) 
2. Cropland conservation reserve 
a. a bid system for long-term land retirement 
b. has the double benefits of soil conservation and reduction in 
crop acreage 
F. Export Promotion 
1. Much agreement that export promotion policies should be included 
in the farm bill 
a. less agreement on specific policies 
2. Most frequently discussed options 
a. export PIK/green dollar program 
b. short, intermediate and long run credit programs 
c. export subsidies 
d. exemption from cargo preference rules 
e. efforts to reduce trade barriers 
f. expanded funding for commodity promotion abroad 
G. Grain Reserves 
1. Biggl"st unknown is the renewal of thP Farmer Owned Resenre (FOR) 
a. in concept, this is a useful program to limit both extreme 
peaks and dips in market prices 
b. in practice, its been difficult to manage and expensive to 
operate 
2. Most likely the FOR will not be renewed 
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a. may be a modest "emergency food reserve" established in its 
place 
H. Payment Limitations 
1. This speaks to both the objectives of cost and fairness 
2. Current limit of $50,000 per producer is likely to be extended, 
or perhaps reduced somewhat 
ANSWER 5--AGREE 
SLIDE 23: SUPPLIES AND PRICES: 1985--WHAT WE SAID! 
A. Our record: 5 out of 7 ( .714 average) 
1. We, along with nearly everyone else, badly missed price 
projections on cattle and hogs 
a. we predi~ted small increases 
b. significant declines actually occurred 
(1) hog prices were down about 9r, from 1984 and about 11% 
below our projected levels 
(2) cattle prices were down about 10% from 1984 and about 
13% below our projection~ last year 
2. For the other commodities, things came out reasonably close to 
our expectations 
QUESTION 6--Milk production is "surging to unprecedented h~ights"_ eve-n wi_th 
declining prices. 
SLIDE 24: MILK PRODUCTION, COWS, AND MILK PER COW 
A. Milk production in 1985 rebounded sharply from the 3% cut in 1984 
1. 1985 Output .. 141.5 billion lbs., up 4.5% 
2. 1984 Output= 135.4 billion lbs., down 3.1% 
a. a major factor in the 1984 cut was a 2.3% decline in cow 
numbers 
b. this was a direct result of the milk diversion program that 
was in effect from Jan. 1, 1984 through March 31, 1985 
B. Several factors are involved in the 198~ increase 
1. A large build-up of high quality dairy replacement heifers during 
the diversion program 
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2. A "race for base" as dairymen anticipate a new diversion or 
production quota system tied to historical production levels. 
3. A significant 3'.%, iump in averagP per-cow production, due to 
a. high quality herd replacements 
b. heavy culling of low-performance cows during the diversion 
program 
c. a favorable milk-feed price ratio 
SLIDE 25: MILK PRICES AND FEED PRICES 
A. the decline in feed costs in 1985 paralleled the decline in milk 
prices 
B. This has held the milk-feed price ratio steady through 1985, even 
though pay prices for milk in late 1985 are about $1/cwt. below a 
year earlier 
SLIDE 26: OHIO MILK PRICES 
A. Prices have come under significant downward pressure 
1. Blend prices (3.5 BF) averaged about $12.30/cwt. in late 1985 
a. minus the 15 cent/cwt. assessment for market promotion 
2. This is down from the $13.25 average in 1984, less the 50 
cent/cwt. assessment to pay the cost of the diversion program 
B. Price decline reflects a cut in the price support level from $12.60 
during 1984 to: 
1. $12.10 on April 1, 1985 
2. $11.60 on July 1, 1985 
C. Lower price support levels have been in response to sharply higher 
government purchases and costs 
1. CCC purchases, milk equivalent 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Bil. pounds 
14.3 
16.8 
8.6 
14.0 
2. Commercial demand has also increased, in part in response to 
lower prices 
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a. up 1% in 1985, to 128 bil. lbs. 
b. but, not enough to absorb the 4.5% production gain 
c. thus, generating the large government purchases 
D. Price support will probably remain at $11.60 for most of 1986 
1. This should hold Ohio farm prices at around $12/cwt. 
2. Assuming that some sort of diversion program is implemented to 
restrain production 
a. could include a whole-herd buy-out as well as a paid 
diversion 
b. will probably be financed by another assessment, thus 
lowering effective returns to producers 
3. If an effective diversion program becomes operational, e.g., cuts 
1986 output by 4% (compared to 3% in 1984), then 
a. 1986 output would drop to around 136 billion pounds 
b. commercial demand should increase another 1% or so, to around 
129.5 billion pounds. 
c. this should cut government purchases by more than half, to 
around 6.S-7 billion pounds. 
d. this would strengthen the Minnesota-Wisconsin pay price 
sufficient to add 50-75 cents to Ohio blend prices (above the 
$12 projected) 
4. If a diversion program is not put in, look for mounting surpluses 
to force another cut in the support price--perhaps to $10.60--in 
the autumn of 1986 
ANSWER 6 AGREE--but not for long! 
QUESTION 7--Egg prices should strengthen in 1986 as demand increases. 
SLIDE 27: CHANGE IN QUANTITY OF FOOD CONSUMED PER CAPITA 
A. First, let's look at trends in domestic food consumption 
B. A general trend over the past 15 years toward more plant products and 
less animal products in the typical diet 
1. Per capita consumption of plant products since 1968 • +11% 
2. Per capita consumption of animal products in same period = -8% 
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r. RPasons for this dietary change Are not entirely r]PAr. but prohAhly 
includP 
l. Health ronrerns (i.e., cholesterol, animal fats) 
2. Aging popu!Rtinn 
3. Demographic changes 
4. More sedentary life style 
5. Food advertising and merchandising 
6. Others? 
D. This change in eating patterns has profound implications for 
agriculture 
SLIDE 28: LIVESTOCK: POULTRY CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA 
A. Among the major categories of animal products are some very diverse 
trends 
1. Both eggs and dairy products have shown a persistent downward 
trend 
a. despite occasional upturns such as in 1979 for eggs and last 
year for milk and dairy products 
2. Red meats, after showing irregular growth in the early and mid 
1970s, appear to be on a general downward trend since about 1977 
3. Poultry meat (mostly broiler chickens) is the most significant 
exception to the general trend 
a. per capita consumption is up 45% since 1968 and 35% since 
1975 
b. total per capita chicken and turkey consumption in 1986 will 
reach 72 lbs. 
(1) just shy of the 72-74 lbs. projected for beef 
(2) well above the 60-61 lbs. of pork 
B. Reasons for the shift away from other animal products to poultry meat 
include: 
1. Health concerns 
2. Relative prices 
a. in 1977: 
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(1) average retail pork prices = 2.5 times broiler prices 
(2) average retail beef prices = 3 times broiler prices 
b. by 1985: 
(1) pork prices averaged 3 times higher than broiler prices 
(2) beef prices were nearly 5 times higher 
3. Rapid adoption of chicken on restaurant menus 
a. particularly at fast food restaurants 
b. chicken is now the most frequent entree on restaurant menus 
SLIDE 29: BROILER PRICES (DEFLATED) AND SUPPLY OF BROILERS PER PERSON 
A. A popular myth is that the demand for chicken has increased 
B. In reality, it appears that there has been little movement in the 
demand curve 
1. That is, at a given real price, people do not appear to be 
consuming more chicken now than earlier 
2. Rather, we have seen a rather persistent movement down the demand 
curve 
a. people, on average, consuming more chicken 
b. but at a declining real price 
C. Whereas, the demand curves for most other categories of animal 
products, including eggs, appear to have shifted to the left 
1. That is, at a given price, people consume less, or 
2. For a given quantity, they are not willing to pay as much 
SLIDE 30: RATE OF LAY, PROD., AND NUMBER OF LAYERS 
A. Egg production has been cut-back in 1985 after increasing in 1984 in 
response to high prices associated with the Asian flu outbreak 
1. 1984 hatch of layer replacements= +13% 
2. 1985 hatch = - 21% 
3. Cyclical peak in potential production, based upon layer numb~rs, 
was reached in May 1985 
4. Rate of lay contjnued to increase in 1985, mainly due to: 
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a. a youngPr, more produrtive flork 
b. lower feed costs which encourage more aggressive fePding 
B. For lq86, production will decl)ne through the first 3 quarters 
1. The flock size will be down 2-3% due to this year's cut in the 
hatch 
2. rate of lay will level out or dPcline as the average flock age 
lengthens 
SLIDE 31: CARTONED EGG PRICES, N.Y. 
A. Prices declined rapidly in earlv 1984 and were at generally 
unprofitable levels through late summer-early fall 1985 
1. During the first half of 1985: 
a. prices were 35% below a year earlier 
b. output was up only about 1% 
2. This suggests a substantially weaker-than-normal demand 
a. normally, a 1% change in production is associated with a 5% 
change in price (in the opposite direction) 
B. Prices have strengthened in late 1985 and should continue to improve 
through the first 3 quarters of 1986 
1. Response to production cuts 
2. Expect a more nonnal price-quantity response than in early 1985 
when prices fell from the unusually high year-earlier levels 
3. Thus the 2-3% cut in experted production during this period 
should result in prices averaging 10-15% above comparable 1985 
levels 
ANSWER 7--DISAGREE 
QUESTION 8--INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN PORK PRODUCTS IS A POSITIVE FACTOR FOR U.S. 
HOG PRICES 
SLIDE 32: PORT IMPORTS & EXPORTS 
A. The graph shows imports and exports of pork products as a percent of 
U.S. commercial production. 
1. Port imports ha,re increased dramatically since 1981. 
a. The largest increases occurred during 1984 and 1985, the same 
period when the dollar reached record levels. 
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b. For the January to May period of 1985, live hog imports from 
Canada increased 55% Jver 1984 levels. 
c. Pork product imports from Canada and Denmark rose 30% from 
the same period ot 1984. 
d. Combining live hogs and pork products, total imports rose 35% 
for the first five months of 1985 to a level representing 
about 10% of U.S. commercial production. 
2. Pork exports from the U.S. have not been substantial. 
a. Nevertheless, the strong dollar has reduced pork exports from 
2.3% of commercial production in 1981 to 0.9% for the first 
five months of 1985. 
3. Net Trade Balance 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985* 
*Jan-May 
% of U.S. Commercial Production 
-1.2 
-3.2 
-3.6 
-6.9 
-9.1 
a. The price effect of the worsened pork trade balance is not 
inconsequential: -$4-5/cwt. 
b. The outlook is for a modest reduction in the pork trade 
deficit into 1986, due to a weakening in the value of the 
dollar and the imposition of countervailing duties on live 
hog imports from Canada. 
c. Total pork imports may decline 5% from 1985 levels. 
SLIDE 33: HOG PROSPECTS 
A. The slide presents information about how sow f arrowings and pro-
fitability is measured by the hog-corn ratio. 
Note: The Pig Crop heading on the table should be Sows Farrowing 
instead 
]. The hog-corn ratio is the number of 
bushels of corn that equals the value of 100 pounds of pork. 
a. Break-even ratio on average is about 20:1 
b. The more the ratio exceeds 20:1, the faster the expansion in 
farrowings and vice versa. 
2. The hog-corn ratio was below 20:1 during the breeding period for 
sows farrowing from December 1984 through August 1985. 
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a. In responsP to the poor profits at breeding, hog farmers 
reduced the number of sows farrowing. 
h. The relationship between the hog-corn ratjo and sows 
tarrow1ng is not exact, yet 1t does yield important 
information about hog farmers' production ]ntentions. 
3. The hog-corn ratio for the latter half of 1985 inched closer to a 
profitable level. 
a. The effect of heightened profit prospects was evjdent in the 
December 1985 - February 1986 farrowing intentions, which 
were only 1% lower than year ago levels. 
b. Low corn prices will likely kPep the hog-corn ratio near 20:1 
for much of 1986. 
c. Thus, a sharp reduction or expansion in sow farrowings is not 
expected. 
B. Sow farrowings do not solely determine the size of the pig crop; the 
second component is the number of pigs-per-litter. 
1. Pigs-per-litter 
1984 1985 1985/84 
Dec-Feb* 7.27 7.51 +3 
Mar-May 7. 58 7.75 +2 
June-Aug 7.60 7.71 +2 
Sept-Nov 7. 52 
*December of preceding year 
a. The number of pigs-per-litter was a record for the March-May 
1985 period. 
c. The general rise in pigs-per-litter is due mainly to favor-
able weather during breeding and farrowing seasons and better 
management practices. 
C. The increases in pigs-per-litter more than offset the smaller number 
of sows farrowing. Thus, the pig crop in 1985 has been larger than 
expected. 
1. Pig Crop 
1984 1985 1985/84 
Dec-Feb* 14,288 14,538 +2 
Mar-May 18,814 18,762 0 
June-Aug 17' 158 16,941 -1 
Sept-Nov 17,420 
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*December of preceding year 
2. Production prospects for 1986 
a. 
1986 I 
1986 II 
1986 III 
1986-85 
Down 1-2% 
Down 1-3% 
Up 1-2% 
b. If producers add pounds to average slaughter weights due to 
low feed costs, productjon may be up for all of 1986. 
SLIDE 34: PORK PRICES (DEFLATED) AND SUPPLY OF PORK PER PERSON 
A. The slide shows two approximate demand relationships for pork on a 
real per capita basis. 
1. The line furthest to the right generally held true over 
1960-1974. 
2. The left line held approximately for 1975-1985. 
a. 1979 and 1980 did not follow the new relationship. 
b. The general leftward shift in the demand for pork in the late 
1970s and early 1980s may be due to: 
1) health and dietary concerns 
2) aging population 
3) geographic population shifts 
3. If the demand schedule had not shifted, pork prices would have 
been 25-35% higher during 1984 and 1985. 
4. An important question is whether the demand curve has shifted 
leftward again during 1984 and 1985. 
a. the 1984 and 1985 observations may have been "random" 
deviations from the 1975-1985 relationship. 
b. If demand had followed the 1975-1983 relationship precisely, 
pork prices would have been 8-12% higher. 
SLIDE 35: HOGS: B & G AT 7 MARKETS 
A. Late 1985 situation 
]. MRrkPti.ngs may be down 1-5% 
a. Mar-May pig ("rop was unchanged over 1984 lPvPls 
b. Inventory of 60-179 pound hogs on September 1 suggests 
producers may be expanding the breeding herd slightly. 
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c. Pork imports may decline from the peak levels experienced 
during the first half of 1985. 
2. Price prospects 
a. Fall '85 hog prices may average $43-46/cwt. 
1) Less pork and beef 
2) More poultry 
b. Annual average for 1985 is expected to be $44-46/cwt. 
B. 1986 price prospects 
1. First half of 1985 
a. 1-3% less port produced in U.S. 
b. 3-5% less pork imports 
c. less beef; more poultry 
d. Prices are expected to average $45-49 
2. Second half of 1985 
a. Marketings may increase modestly 
b. Breeding herd may also expand due to incentive of low 
feed costs 
c. B & G prices may average $44-48 
ANSWER 8--DISAGREE 
QUESTION 9--ECONOMISTS HAVE ESTABLISHED AN ENVIABLE RECORD IN FORECASTING FED 
CATTLE PRICES 
SLIDE 36: CATTLE SLAUGHTER WEIGHTS 
A. Cattle prices for 1985 have been $10-$20/ cwt. lower than forecast by 
everyone, including economists, advisory services, and cattlemen 
themselves. Three factors are thought to be responsible for the 
lower than expected prices. 
1. Live slaughter weights averaged 1101 pounds for the first nine 
months of 1985, 3.4% higher than year-ago levels. 
a. The increase in slaughter weights was even more dramatic for 
the June-September 1985 period; average weights were up 4.3% 
compared to the same period in 1984. 
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b. Dressed weights were at record levels for much of the first 
nine months of 1985. 
c. Contributing to the heavier weights was: 
1) a shift in the slaughter mix as cow slaughter declined 
to 19% of total slaughter, down from 22% a vear earlier. 
2) Futures prices and price forecasts showed premiums for 
later delivery and contributed to the reluctance to 
sell. 
d. Despite the large increase in average weights, beef 
production under federal inspection through August was about 
the same as a year earlier. 
SLIDE 37: FARM-RETAIL PRICE SPREADS: CHOICE BEEF 
A. Relatively wide farm-to-retail beef margins were a significant factor 
in the lower than expected cattle prices. 
1. Between December 1984 and June 1985, cattle prices were down 
13.7%, wholesale beef prices declined 12.5%, but retail prices 
declined by only 3.5%. 
a. The U.S. average retail price of beef during the second 
quarter of 1985 was $2.34/pound. 
1) If retail prices had fully reflected the lower average 
steer price, they would have been down 17 cents from a 
year earlier and down 11 cents from the previous 
quarter. 
2) This suggests less than full retail adjustment to live 
cattle price changes occurred. 
3) It should b noted that after reaching a record level of 
$1.17 in July, the farm-to-retail spread narrowed to 
$1.14 during August. 
b. The wider farm-to-retail price spread can explain 
$3.00-$3.50/cwt. of the year-to-year decline in choice 
steer prices. 
c. As live cattle prices rise through the end of 1985, retail 
prices will likely lag behind, resulting in a narrowing of 
the farm-to-retail price spread. 
B. Lower value of by-products, including hides, has contributed $1.00 to 
$1.50/cwt, of the year-to-year price decline in choice steer prices. 
SLIDE 38: BEEF PRODUCTION IN 1986 
A. Slaughter (35.0 - 35.5 mil) 
Feds 
Nonf eds 
B. Weights (1070 - 1080 lbs) 
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1986/85 
-2 to -4% 
-2 to -4% 
-2 to -4'.7.'. 
-2 to -3't 
1. More fed and less nonfed will keep upward pressure on slaughter 
weights 
1986/85 
C. Beef Output (22 - 22.5 mil. lbs.) 
-4 to -6% 
1. First half 
-4 to -6% 
a. Fewer cattle placed on feed during third and fourth quarters 
of 1985. 
b. Slaughter of cows and nonfed steers and heifers will continue 
to drop. 
2. Second half 
-6 to -8% 
a. Further declines in fed marketings during third and 
fourth quarters. 
b. Lower dressed weights 
D. Imports 
1. Near quota level 
E. Beef/Person (Retail Weight) 
1. Supply -5% 
2. Population growth +1% 
3. Retail weight 74-75 lbs. 
a. 1984 about 78.6 lbs. 
F. Retail price /lb. for choice beef $2.36 - $2.42 
1. Jan-June 1985 price was $2.37 
2. July-Dec. 1985 price may be $2.30 
3. Unlikely that retail prices will break through the $2.40 - $2.45 
level in 1986; a resistance point for consumers in recent years. 
SLIDE 39: CHOICE BEEF PRICES (DEFLATED) AND SUPPLY OF BEEF PER PERSON 
A. Demand shifts for beef have been even more complex than pork. 
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1. Appears to be three different relationships (approximately): 
a. 1960-1968 
1) An "elastic" relationship; a given price change causes a 
more than proportionate change in quantity. 
b. 1969-197 9 
1) A much less "elastic" relationship 
2) A shift outward of entire relationship; at a given 
quantity a higher price results 
('. 1980-85 
1) The least "elastic" relationship of the three; a given 
change in price harrlly affects consumptjon. 
2) In addition, the entire demand schedule pivoted inward. 
2. The recent shifts inward in demand may be associated with the 
same factors as affected pork demand: 
a. health and dietary concerns 
b. aging population 
c. geographic population shifts 
3. The changing slope of the relationships, or their elasticity, may 
be due to the changing consumption patterns of families. 
a. As more women work outside of the house, away-from-home food 
consumption increases. 
b. People may not be as sensitive to price changes when eating 
away from home. 
4. It is doubtful that beef demand will be become more "inelastic" 
in the future, but it is possible that further shifts inward of 
the relationship could occur. 
SLIDE 40: STEER PRICES, 900-1100# CHOICE 
A. Review of 1985 
1. Jan.-Sept. 1 85 steer prices averaged $57.32/cwt., or $8.96/cwt. 
lower than during the same period of 1984. 
a. Steer prices were above the 5-year average only in January. 
b. During March through September, stPer prires were below the 
5-vear low each month. 
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1) During the summPr months, stf'Pr pricPs Wf'rf' $10.00 to 
$15.00 /r:wt. lowi:>r th;.in prPvio11s "i-yf';.ir !nws. 
2) Pri.ce-s averap.;erl $52/rwt. tor the third-quartE>r; the 
lowest third-quarter price since 1977. 
c. As stated earlier, it was felt that these factors were 
responsible: 
1) Increased live weights 
2) Wider marketing margins 
3} Lower by-product values 
d. Prices are expected to strengthen during late fall as 
production declines. 
1) Average $60-62/cwt. for the fourth quarter 
2) Prices will likely return to moving in the range of 
prices for the previous 5 years. 
B. 1986 prospects: first half of year 
1. Beef output down 4 to 6% 
a. Fed marketings may decline 7 to 9%, but heavy slaughter 
weights will limit production declines. 
b. Nonfed slaughter will be reduced. 
2. Prices are expected to continue in the low 60s during the first 
quarter, and rise to the mid to upper 60s during the second 
quarter. 
C. 1986 Prospects: Second half of year 
1. Beef output down 6 to 8% 
a. Moderate gains in consumer income 
b. 4% rise in poultry production will limit any price increases 
from 5% overall decline in red meat production. 
2. Fed cattle prices may average $63-68/cwt. 
SLIDE 41: FEEDER STEER PRICES: 600-700# KY. MED. NO. 1 
A. Demand for feeder cattle is a derived demand with the principal 
components being consumer demand for beef and the supply cost of 
feed. 
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1. Continued liquidation of the breeding herd to maintain cash flow, 
low fed cattle prices, the reluctance of lenders and producers to 
assume the risks of feeding cattle have constrained feeder cattle 
prices. 
a. Kentucky feeder cattle prices averaged $62.29/cwt. in the 
first half of 1985, near the five-year average for the 
period. 
b. Feeder prices followed fed cattle prices and moved to the 
bottom side of the five-year range during the summer months. 
B. 1985 calf crop is estimated at 41.1 million head, or 3.3% below 1984. 
1. However, increased productivity has offset part of the drop. 
a. 88.9 calves born per 100 cows in 1985, compared to 87.4 in 
1984. 
2. Supplies of feeder cattle outside of feedlots on July l, 1985 was 
estimated to be 4.7% below year earlier levels. 
3. Expectations are that 500-600 pound feeders in Kentucky grading 
Medium No. 1 will average $62-68/cwt. during the fall of 1985. 
C. Prospects for 1986 
1. A turn-around in fed cattle prices and lower feed costs may 
support aggressive feedlot demand. 
2. If herd liquidation ends and expansion begins during 1986, a 
further tightening of supply could strengthen feeder cattle 
prices. 
3. Cow-calf producers in Ohio and the surrounding area have ample 
grass and stored hay and may hold feeders tightly. 
4. Feeder cattle prices may average $63 to $69/cwt. for 1986. 
ANSWER 9 -- DISAGREE 
QUESTION 10--Most participants in the government corn program should make 
modest profits on their 1985 crop. 
SLIDE 42: CORN: SUPPLY AND USE 
A. Supplies for the 1985-86 marketing year will be 9.8 billion bushels, 
up 17% from last year 
1. Acreage harvested for grain• 74.8 million, +4.2% 
2. Average yield= about 115 bu./acre, +8% 
a. a new record high, topping 1982's 113.2 bu./acre average 
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b. in Ohio, 128 hu./acrP, 11p trom l\C, h11. last vPar 
3. Carrvover on October I, 198~ ~ 1. •billion bushPls, +R2~ 
B. Use in 1985-86 is expected at around 7.0-7.1 billion bushels, Jitt]e 
changed from 1984-85's 7.06 billion 
1. Domestic use will increase modestly from last year's 5.2 billion 
bushels 
2. Industrial demand, food and seed uses have expanded at an annual 
rate of nearly 10% over the past five years 
a. should increase by 60-65 million bushels this year, somewhat 
less than in recent years 
b. most of the increase associated with increased production of 
high fructose corn syrup 
c. no major new market looms, such as the switch to corn 
sweetner in soft drinks over the past few years 
d. capital commitment to expand ethyl alcohol production as an 
octane enhancer appears limited by: 
1) low cost ethyl imports, mainly from Brazil 
2) concern over negative public reaction in times of food 
shortages 
3. Feed use may increase marginally, but no sizeable increase is 
likely 
a. the number of grain-consuming animal units will remain nearly 
level 
1) gains in poultry and dairy cattle numbers will be just 
about off set by declines in hogs and cattle on feed 
b. average feeding rate may increase nominally in response to 
somewhat lower feed costs 
1) but increase is limited by price support level 
c. continued strong competition from wheat and other feed grains 
1) particularly in the high plains of Texas and Kansas where 
the largest increases in cattle feeding have occurred 
2) large competing supplies of feed wheat and grain sorghum 
4. Exports will decline 10-15%, to around 1.6 billion bushels 
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a. will probably be the lowest since 1976's 1.68 billion and 
could even be lower 
b. several reasons 
1) continued relativ@ly strong dollRr 
2) dramatic increases in world production of feed grains in 
the past two years, particularly in: 
i) Western Europe 
ii) China 
iii) India 
iv) South Africa 
v) Thailand 
3) an improved grain harvest in the Soviet Union, up about 
ten million metric tons to 180 million 
4) increased competition from cassava (tapioca), primarily 
from Thailand 
i) mixed 80-20 with soymeal, it replaces an equal weight 
of corn 
ii) enters many markets, particularly the EC, with a 
much lower tariff than does corn 
c. Corn carryout on September 30, 1q86 is projected at 2.6 to 
2.8 billion bushels 
1) more than double this year's carry-in 
2) second largest ever to the 1982-83 carryover of 3.1 
billion bushels 
3) large enough to keep prices in the doldrums 
SLIDE 43: U.S. CONSUMPTION OF MEAT AND CORN FOR FEED 
A. This shows the relationship between consumer incomes, meat con-
sumption and the domestic use of corn as feed 
B. In the 1960's and l970's, higher real spendable incomes brought 
increases in both: 
1. spending on meat 
2. the quantity of meat consumed 
C. This sp)lled over into profitable feeding ~onditions and increased 
d@mand for feedstuffs, particularly corn 
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D. So far in thP 1980's, however, income inrreases have not generated 
jncreased meat ronsumption 
l. spending on medt has actually derlined. 
2. more of the mPat consumPd is rhi~ken, whirh requires l~ss fPed 
per pound than pork or bPet 
3. the result has been a downward shift in the domestic feed dPmand 
for corn 
4. this has been further aggravated hy increased wheat feeding 
E. Thus, the outlook for further growth in domestic feed use of corn 
does not appear bright enough to solve the surplus production 
problem 
SLIDE 44: CORN: STOCKS-PRICE/LOAN RELATIONSHIP 
A. The size of year-end carryout stocks is the dominant factor in 
determining season average prices relative to loan rates 
1. when carryout exceeds about 1-1.2 billion bushels, prices tend to 
average near the price support loan rate 
2. carryouts of less than around 800 million bushels appear to be 
necessary to drive prices appreciably above loan rates 
B. The 2.6 billion bushel or so expected carryout this year is not 
likely to change the pattern 
1. because of early season low prices, the 12 month average may not 
reach the $2.55 loan rate 
SLIDE 45: CORN: OHIO AVERAGE FARM PRICE 
A. Last year we predicted a season average price for 1984-85 in the 
$2.6~-$3.00 range 
1. Actual average was $2.bl 
2. Average was pulled down by the sharp drop-off through last summer 
in anticipation of the record 1985 harvest 
B. For 1985-86, we expect prices to average in the $2.30-2.55 range 
1. A harvest low of $2.04 was recorded in October 
2. Prices should begin to trend upward as the 1985 crop finds 
storage space 
3. The up-side price potential is currently determined primarily by 
the CCC loan program 
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a. About 70~~ of the 1985 crop is eligible for loan at a national 
average of $2.55 
1) this is equivalent to about 5.9 billion bushels that 
could be isolated from the market under nine month loans 
2) if just 60% (low estimate) enters loan (3.5 billion 
bushels), some loan redemptions will be necessary to meet 
market needs (vs. carryout of around 2.6 billion) 
3) with harvest prices around $2, incentive to put corn 
under loan is great 
4. The question is, how high? 
a. redemption values are loan rates plus interest plus some 
return to storage costs 
b. loan rates in the western corn belt (Iowa) are roughly ten 
cents below Ohjo (about $2.50 compared to $2.60 here) 
c. interest is abottt l. 7 cents/bushel/month 
d. this puts Iowa redemption values in the spring-early summer 
at about $2.58 plus whatever return to storage the producer 
is willing to accept 
e. assuming some producers will settle for as little as one cent 
per bushel per month return to storage, this puts redemption 
prices in Iowa at roughly $2.65 for the April-May period 
5. the eastern cornbelt price advantage over the western cornbelt 
has disappeared with the weak export market 
a. thus, the spring price target for Ohio is roughly $2.65 as 
well 
b. with a state average loan rate= $2.59 and 1.7 cents per 
month interest, this indicates little likelihood of a 
profitable loan redemption opportunity for Ohio producers 
C. Will this be sufficient to return a profit to Ohio growers who 
participated in the 1985 government program? 
1. Assume a $2.59 loan, 30 cents storage costs for nine months, and 
forfeiture of the grain at the end of the loan 
a. net return is $2.29 from the loan 
b. add to this a 48 cent deficiency payment 
c. total return from government program= $2.77 
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2. Add in nearlv riskless gain of 10-1"> cents frnm the purrhasP and 
resale of an "at the money" May call option to hPnPtit from pricP 
appreciation through spring 
L effective valuP per bushel is pnshPd to around $2.90 
4. with average Ohio yield of l28 bushels per arre, this brings 
gross returns per acre to around $370 
a. assume $170 per acre for variable costs and $85-90 per acre 
for nonland fixed costs 
b. the residual of $100 or so per acre becomes net returns to 
land 
c. with average cash rents of something around $80, this 
generates a modest profit 
ANSWER 10--AGREE 
QUESTION 11--Soybean prices during the 1985-86 market year are "stuck" at the 
CCC loan rate. 
SLIDE 46: SOYBEANS: SUPPLY AND USE 
A. Supplies for the 1985-86 marketing year are around 2.4 billion 
bushels, up 18% from 1984-85 
1. Acreage harvested= 62.2 million, down 6% 
2. Average yields put at about 33.8 bushels per acre 
a. a new record high, besting 1979's 32.1 bushels 
b. up 20% from last year's 28.2 bushels 
3. Carryover on September 1, 1985 = 318 million bushels, up 81% 
B. Use in 1985-86 is expected to total 1.8 billion bushels or a bit 
more, up about 6% from 1984-85 
1. Exports are running well ahead of the year earlier pace (up about 
25% through the first two months of the market year) 
a. should total between 650 and 700 million bushels, up from 598 
million last year (+10-15%) 
1) 1984-85 exports were down 19% and were 35% below the 
1981-82 peak 
b. upturn reflects: 
1) a somewhat lower value of the dollar vis-a-vis currencies 
of soybean-buying countries 
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2) lower South American exports 
3) lower soybean prices 
4) a modest upturn in world animal numbers 
5) more cassava feeding, particularly in western Europe and 
Japan which requires more protein supplement 
2. Domestic crush should be about even with last year to nominally 
higher 
a. mainly because soymeal demand has been strengthening due to 
its low price relative to corn 
b. in 1984-85, soymeal:corn price ratio: 1.33 
1) in the late 1970's and early 1980's it was 1.8 to 2.1 
2) a ratio based on feeding value is in the 1.5-1.7 range 
C. Carryout next August 30 is likely to be around 590 million bushels, 
up 85% from this year's carry-in 
1. This will be the largest ever, topping the previous high of 358 
million in 1980 by about 65% 
SLIDE 47: SOYMEAL CARRYOVER AND PRICE 
A. Soymeal stocks increased about 65% at the end of the 1984-85 mar-
keting year 
1. Exports were down 10%, reflecting 
a. weak demand 
b. aggressive South American competition 
2. Domestic use increased nearly 10%, primarily in rPsponse to low 
prices 
3. Prices had to be discounted to the lowest levels in more than a 
decade to find buyers for the larger crush 
a. last year's 9% increase in crush was driven by an unusually 
strong oil market 
B. Stocks wil1 probably decline modestly this year 
1. continued relatively low prices should stimulate both domestic 
and export demand 
2. crush may increase marginally 
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C. Prjce~ should push up toward $1~0 per ton hv early spring 
]. this would be roughly Pquivalent to about 1.7 times thP corn 
price, or about in parity with relative feeding values 
SLIDE 48: SOYOIL CARRYOVER AND PRICE 
A. For the past two years carryover stocks have been at very low levels 
1. This reflects reasonably strong export demand and a trend-line 2 
per~ent per year increase in domestic demand 
a. export demand was helped bv disappointing production of other 
edible oils, mainly palm oil 
2. This year export sales are expected to weaken by 8-10%, due to 
a. recovered Malaysian palm production 
b. record oilseed production in western Europe 
1) mainly sunflower and rapeseed 
2) but, soybeans are increasing rapidly--acreage in France 
and Italy has increased ten-fold since 1980 
B. Carryout stocks will increase roughly 20% this year 
1. This suggests that prices will probably average in the low 20 
cent area (21-25 cents per pound) 
2. however, oil prices are much more difficult to predict because of 
the wide array of edible oils that figure ]n the world market 
SLIDE 49: 1985 SOYBEANS: A JOINT PRODUCT 
A. Last year we said, a season average price in 1984-85 in the 
$6.00-6.50 range 
1. Actual average was $5.80 
B. This year, product values of 
1. oil in the 21-25 cent range 
2. meal in the $128-146 range (could be a bit higher) 
3. yields a product value per bushel in the $5.31-6.17 range 
4. from this, must deduct the crushing margin which is normally in 
the 20-40 cents range 
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5. this generates an expected market price for soybeans in 
$5. 00->"1. 80 range 
SLIDE 50: SOYBEANS: AVERAGE OHIO FARM PRICES 
A. Prices have started out ;n 1985-86 below $5.00, closely parall~ling 
the last big crop year 1n 1982-83 
1. the entire crop is eligible for CCC loans at a national average 
of $5.02 
2. with harvest prices well below loan, entries should be sizeable 
3. thus, some loan redemptions appear necessary prior to the 
marketing of the 1986 South American crop (April-May) 
4. minimum redemption prices in March-April are around $5.20 plus 
some return to storage costs 
a. adding in three cents per month storage returns raises the 
redemption price to about $5.35 in the March-April period 
5. with relatively strong export demand this winter, due primarily 
to the unavailability of South American supplies (they were sold 
out prior to the U.S. harvest), a realistic price expectation is 
above the $5.35 redemption value 
a. perhaps in the $5.40-5.60 range, pre-plant 
B. Post-planting, price trends will be determined by 
1. size of the 1986 crop 
2. weather prospects 
3. marketing strategies by Brazil and Argentina 
ANSWER 11--DISAGREE 
QUESTION 12: Wheat Yields Around the World are Escalating Rapidly, Putting a 
"Damper" on U.S. Exports 
SLIDE 51: WHEAT YIELDS 
A. The slide shows the wheat yields for five countries--India, U.S., 
China, France, and England--from 1973-74 through 1984-85 
1. Country 73/74 Yield 84/85 Yield Change 
India 18.88 27.51 +45. 7% 
China 17.99 43.27 +240. 'j% 
France 66. en 102.01 +52 .4% 
England 64.83 112.71 +73.8% 
u.s. 31.67 38 .81 +22. S~o 
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2. Re]ative change in wheat yields is a limited measure of chanp,es 
in physical production efficiency 
R. while recof,nizing the limitation, vield increases around thP 
world sugHest that the U.S. physiral production advantage tor 
wheat h~s decljned 
3. Implications 
a. the suggested decline in relative wheat production efficiency 
raises the question of whether U.S. wheat growers can 
generate sufficient exports to regain 1970s style prosperity, 
even if the dollar declines and stronger demand fundamentals 
rPappear 
b. increasing wheat yields in other countries has put their 
agriculture in a more competitive position to respond to 
increases in worldwide wheat demand 
SLIDE 52: WHEAT: SUPPLY AND USE 
A. 1985-86 supply is 3.8 billion bushels, down 5% from last year's 
record level 
1. Production= 2.4 billion bushels, down 7.5% 
a. acreage = 64.6 million acres, down 3.4% 
b. average yield= 36.8 bushels per year, down 5.1% 
1) yield was third highest on record 
2) but, only 1.3% above five-year average 
2. Carry-in= 1.4 billion bushels, about the same as last year's 
a. second largest carry-in on record 
b. carry-in equals 62% of projected use for 1985-86 
B. Projected use during 1985-86 = 2.2 - 2.3 billion bushels, down 10-15% 
1. Domestic u~e = 1.0S - 1.11 billion bushels, about the same as the 
previous year 
a. feed use will remain historically high--about 350 million 
bushels--but down from the recoro 412 million bushels fed in 
1984-85 
1) wheat/corn price ratio will be up about 15% 
2) historically, have fed only JS0-200 million bushels of 
wheat 
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3) wheat feedin~ Rupportea by heavy shift of cattle to major 
wheat statP~ ~f fansas and Texas 
2. Exports= aroundl.1 b11lion bushels, down 12 to 15% 
a. since 1981-82 the U.S. has lost one-third of its share of 
worldwide wheat exports 
b. reasons for the decline include: 
1) strong U.S. dollar 
2) high U.S. loan rate relative to world wheat prices 
3) increased production in both importing and exporting 
countries 
4) debt repayment problems in developing countries 
5) use of export subsidies, particularly the European 
community 
SLIDE 53: WHEAT: STOCKS-PRICE/LOAN RELATIONSHIP 
A. Chart shows that when carryout exceeds about 1.1 billion bushels, 
season average price falls close to the Joan rate 
1. About 74% of 1985 crop is el i.gi.ble for price support loans of a 
national average rate of $3.30 per bushPl 
B. 1985-86 carryout of about 1.5 billion bushels indicates a season 
average price below the loan rate 
1. For Ohio, this suggests a season average price in the $2.80-$3.10 
range 
2. For those who participated in the 1985 wheat program, an addi-
tional $1.08 will be received in the form of a deficiency 
payment 
SLIDE 54: WHEAT: OHIO AVERAGE PRICES 
A. Last fall a season average price of $3.20-$3.40 per bushel was 
predicted 
1. Actual Ohio average was $3.35 per bushel with litt]e seasonal 
variation 
13. Dttfl' to th@ larp,e whfl'at crop and unc-ertai.nty irnrrounding futurE> wheat 
programs, Ohio wheat prices moved sharply downwards over the 
June-September 1 85 period 
I. During September, prices were 72 cents below the loan rate 
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C. Prices are expected to improve during the fall as the basis tightens 
and futurPs prires inrrease 
n. MarkPtinr, TPC'Ollltnf'rnfations 
1. Use the loan when eligible 
a. loan rate of $3.30/ bushel and target rate of $4.38/bushel 
b. wheat prices will need to reach $3.50/bushel in order to 
redeem loans when interest at 7 3/4% is charged for nine 
months 
2. Significant basis appreciation occurs for wheat during the 
October to May marketing period 
a. based on current interest rates, basis appreciation may cover 
carrying charges 
b. for wheat not under loan, check futures contract spreads for 
the best selling date 
QUESTION 13--DECLINING LAND COSTS WILL MAKE WHEAT PRODUCTION MORE ATTRACTIVE 
COMPARED TO CORN 
A. The sJide shows production costs for a 600 acre Ohio farm for varying 
level of yields and rents 
1. Land rent of $35 per acre is associated with 90 bushels per acre 
corn, 28 bushels per acre soybeans, and 30 bushels per acre 
wheat 
2. Land rent of $70 per acre is associated with 120 bushels per acre 
corn, 38 bushels per acre soybeans, and 45 bushels per acre 
wheat 
3. Land rent of $110 per acre is associated with 150 bushels per 
acre corn, 44 bushels per acre soybeans, and 60 bushels per acre 
wheat 
4. Per bushel costs of production for each yield and rent com-
bination are presented 
a. variable costs 
b. non-land fixed costs 
<'. land rent 
B. Total cost of production is lowei o~ che higher rent ground 
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1. Cost Differential Between Low and H;~h Rent 
Corn :? .22/bu. 
Soybeans $1.CQ/bu. 
Wheat $1. ll /bu. 
2. This occurs despite increasing land costs on a per bushel basis 
C. Two decisions neerl to be made based on the relationship bPtween 
production costs and prices 
1. whether to farm the land, or let it lay idle 
2. if the land is to be farmed, what crops should be grown 
3. if land is to be farmed, prices must equal or exceed non-land 
fixed plus variable costs for at least one crop 
a. lowest rent ground ($35/acre) 
Corn 
Soybeans 
Wheat 
Non-land Costs 
$2.43 
$6.15 
$4.37 
Price 
$2.30-2.55 
$5.00-5.80 
$2.80-3.10 
1) without government deficiency payments it is unlikely 
that such land would be farmed 
2) if the land was enrolled in the government program it is 
likely to only grow corn, and good management would be 
required to make a profit 
b. medium rent ground ($70/acre) 
Corn 
Soybeans 
Wheat 
Non-land costs 
$2.00 
$4.81 
$3.17 
Price 
$2.30-2.55 
$5.00-5.80 
$2.80-3.10 
1) price exceeds non-land costs for all crops without 
government deficiency payments 
c. highest rent land ($110/acre) 
1) price is greater than non-land costs 
D. Relative profitability of alternative crops will determine the crop 
mix on land that will be farmed 
I. Corn 
($70 rent) 
( $1 lO rent) 
2. Soybeans 
($70 rent) 
( 110 rent) 
3. Wheat 
($70 rent) 
($110 rent) 
Price 
2.42 
2.42 
5.40 
5.40 
2.95 
2.95 
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Costs 
2.67 
2.61 
6.65 
6.31 
4.73 
4.43 
Margin 
-.25 
-.19 
-1.25 
-0.91 
-1.77 
-1.48 
4. Without government deficiency payments, wheat has by farm the 
largest losses 
a. only with deficiency payments is wheat competitive with corn 
and soybeans 
b. even if all land rents fall, wheat will not be more attrac-
tive than corn or soybeans 
ANSWER QUESTION 13: DISAGREE 
SLIDE 56: Supplies and Prices: 1986 
A. See slide for sunnnary 
B. This will become next year's score card 
QUESTION 14--Cash flow can be managed to meet farm and family needs 
SLIDE 57: MANAGING CASH FLOWS 
A. Some strategies that need to b~ considered relative to successfu] 
cash flow managem~nt 
I. Postpone unnecessary farm and family expenditures 
a. may require modifying business, family living goals and 
objectives 
2. Seeks ways to increase cash receipts 
a. market in a timely manner 
b. sell excess, unproductive asse~s 
c. off-farm earnings 
3. Reduce cash operating expenses 
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a. hold the l·ne on borrowing 
b. calculate earnings per dollar spent before spending 
c. delay capital expenditures where possible 
3. Reschedule debt repayment 
4. Manage taxes carefully 
a. take advantage of loss provisions 
b. avoid "back tax'' liabilities in liquidation of depreciablP 
assets 
5. Consider selling land, custom hire, culling livestock 
a. sales - lease back arrangements on land can reduce cash flow 
requirements to service land debt 
b. custom hire may reduce needed capital equipment 
1) hiring out on a custom basis may increase revenue without 
jeopardizing your farming operation 
c. cull livestock that are not generating sufficient income to 
cover out-of-pocket costs 
B. Survival 
1. Plan around your management and financial strengths 
a. reduce or eliminate those activities or enterprises that are 
marginal 
b. Concentrate on what you can do best with the resources (land, 
labor, fixed investment) that you own or control 
2. Manage effectively 
a. optimize production efficiency, e.g. maximize output per 
dollar invested 
b. be alert to innovative financial strategies 
1) effective cash management--do not let it stand idle (pay 
interest-bearing bills or invest in short-term deposits) 
2) outside equity/risk-sharing capital 
c. Develop, maintain and use a marketing plan 
SLIDE 58: PRICING THE 1985 CORN CROP 
53 
A. This illustrates some pricing options for the 1985 corn crop that 
rould he ronsiderPd in a marketing plan 
H. ThP sAmP options Apply to next vear's crop and crops therPRftPr 
l. althouP,h <let.'lils ot surh thinp,s RH thP ArrP:lgP Hedurti.on Prop,rRm 
(ARP) and CCC loans may vary 
C. Marketing requires constant and skillful attention 
1. know production costs 
2. set realistic prjcing, profit ohiectives 
::i. not local "br!'tgging rights" for hitting the top of the 
market 
3. learn how seasonal price patterns are affected by such things as: 
a. crop size 
b. weather 
c. government programs 
4. study your local basis patterns 
5. establish trigger points for sales 
a. "scale-up" rather than "wait-for-the-peak" 
6. implement the plan 
a. make cautious modificatjons as market conditions change 
b. rationalize modifications with evidence of weaknesses in 
ad ginal plan 
SLIDF. 59: DIVERSIFIED PRICING PLAN FOR SOYBEANS 
A. This is a hypothetical examp]e, but the basic principles are valid in 
many situations 
1. each person must decide the appropriate percentages for pricing 
at each point 
B. Uncontrollable factors are: 
1. Future price trends 
a. uncertain 
b. likely to increase 
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c. likely to decrease 
2. Strategic variables--when and how to price 
1. preplant 
2. preharvest 
3. harvest 
4. post-harvest 
a. winter 
b. spring 
D. Many other variations possible 
1. Tailor the plan to your business circumstances 
2. devote the time necessary to do a good job 
ANSWER 14--AGREE 
